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Item 11
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON REGULATION OF THE PROFESSION
Outline and Summary of Recommendations

Page
General Discussion

1.

Entry into the Profession

1-8
8

Recommendation

No change recommended in present entry require
ments or in structure and administration of the
CPA Examination.
2.

Technical Standards

8

Recommendation

State boards of accountancy and other regulatory
agencies should not impose different or addition
al standards to those established by FASB or
AuSB.

3.

Maintenance of Competence

9

Recommendation

CPE should be a requirement of state boards of
accountancy as a condition of continued licensing
and should be a condition of membership for all
members in public practice of AICPA and state
CPA societies.

4.

Surveillance of Compliance
with Professional Standards

Recommendations

a)

A program for affirmatively seeking out
substandard work for possible disciplinary
action should be adopted in which AICPA,
state CPA societies and state boards of
accountancy serve complementary roles.

12

-2Page

b)

5.

AICPA, state CPA societies and state boards
of accountancy should require that licensees
and CPAs in practice be subject to a review
of the quality of their work.
Selection for
this review would be on a random selection
basis and recognition would be given for
peer reviews undergone as a member of the
division for firms.

The Disciplinary Process

Recommendations

a)

Duplication of investigations and hearings
should be minimized to the extent possible
consistent with the profession maintaining
a self-regulating posture. NASBA should be
engaged, on behalf of state boards, to
review the JEEP process to provide a basis
for the boards1 deferral to JEEP to the
maximum extent feasible. JEEP should
advise the state board of all investigations
where the findings suggest a disciplinary
hearing (trial board proceeding), so that
the state board may enter the process at
any subsequent point as it considers
appropriate. At such time as the state
board enters, the profession would cease
its independent proceedings and rely on
those of the state board.

State boards should be encouraged to submit
complaints to JEEP for initial investigation.
In all such cases, state boards would be
advised of the findings regardless of
whether disciplinary action was considered
appropriate or not.

b)

Disciplinary hearings by state boards or
the profession should be open to the public
and the hearing panels should include some
public members.

17

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
REGULATION OF THE PROFESSION

The committee was formed following a suggestion by

AICPA President Wallace Olson at the 1978 Annual Meeting of
the National Association of State Boards of Accountancy that

a review be made of the way the profession is regulated.

Our

charge was to evaluate present regulation of the profession
including the division of duties among the regulating insti
tutions and to offer suggestions on how regulation might be

improved.

To gain a broad perspective, the Chairman of the

AICPA Board of Directors appointed to the committee a chairman
three individuals recommended by NASBA, three who are or were

formerly associated with the AICPA disciplinary effort, and

three who have been active in their state CPA society regula
tory effort but have had relatively little AICPA committee
activity.
The accounting profession is heavily regulated.
say it is overregulated.

Many

And others say that whether over

regulated or not, the regulation has not been effective.

Regulation comes from many sources and has many forms.

The state accountancy laws regulate qualifications for entry

into the profession and provide for a board of accountancy

(or its equivalent) to regulate, through rulemaking authority,
the practice of accounting.
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The state boards of accountancy regulate entry into
the profession through requiring applicants to meet

specified minimum education standards and, in some cases,

minimum experience requirements; and through administration

of the Uniform CPA Examination prepared and graded on an
advisory basis by AICPA.

In addition, as a condition of

continued licensing, 36 states now require varying amounts

of CPE (continuing professional education) of all licensed
practitioners.

All state boards process complaints against

CPAs and others licensed in their state, but the level of

enforcement activity is uneven.

In addition, some state

boards have required quality reviews in connection with

disposition of complaints alleging substandard practice.
Only a few state boards can be said to have an effective
procedure for promoting adherence to standards, but there

are signs that others are adopting more effective programs.
The National Association of State Boards of Accountancy

(NASBA) functions as a clearing house for ideas and informa
tion of use to boards in discharging their statutory respon
sibilities.

It acts on behalf of the boards in evaluating

the AICPA Uniform CPA Examination.
State boards of accountancy operate under legislative

oversight and many are subject to "sunset review” statutes.

Sunset laws typically provide for licensing boards to be
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terminated unless, following a review of their purpose and

the effectiveness of their activities, their existence

is renewed by the legislature.

Sunset reviews conducted

up to now have been searching, and it can be expected that
state boards will continually be called upon to demonstrate

active and effective enforcement of standards in the public

interest.
The voluntary professional associations, AICPA and

the state CPA societies, regulate their members by adopting
codes of ethics which require adherence to technical and

behavioral standards.

They also provide extensive programs

of continuing professional education.

The AICPA and some

state societies have adopted voluntary programs of peer

review of members’ accounting practices.

AICPA has developed

within the Division for CPA Firms a program under which
firms voluntarily agree to a peer review once every three
years and to 120 hours of CPE over three years for all

professional staff.

Financial accounting standards are estab

lished by the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the
AICPA establishes standards in auditing and reporting, and
in most other areas of practice.
In addition to the regulation by the voluntary associa

tions on the state and national level, and by the state boards
of accountancy, the profession is regulated directly or
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indirectly by various federal agencies, particularly the

Securities and Exchange Commission and those agencies having

specific requirements for financial statement filings to be

made with them, by the Justice Department and the Federal
Trade Commission, by counterpart state agencies, and by

the courts where civil or criminal sanctions can result
from failure to comply with standards.

Within the past few

years, the Congress has also focused its attention on the
accounting profession and continues to exercise a degree
of oversight.

Finally, the profession is regulated by the marketplace,
for if it does not provide a useful service in a trustworthy

manner, the public will have its needs fulfilled elsewhere.
Hence it can fairly be said that the accounting profes

sion is comprehensively regulated.

Nevertheless, some

question whether the regulation is working as well as it
should, or whether the regulation is achieving the poten

tial benefits it should.
The committee recognizes that one of the hallmarks
of a profession is self-regulation in the interest of the
public.

While some feel that self-regulation is a contradiction

in terms — that the regulated can’t be regulators — we

believe that it is not too much to expect that CPAs will

-5-

recognize that it is in their long term self-interest to
self-regulate and to do so effectively.

In its narrowest sense, self-regulation begins with

the individual CPA and involves an awareness that by virtue
of licensure he has a public trust.

From this flows a

personal obligation to maintain competence and perform at

the highest level of competence.
To assist each other in meeting this obligation,

individuals form voluntary organizations to assist, among
other things, in regulating their professional activities.
Thus, CPAs often join an organization and vote for a CPE

requirement to be a condition of membership and individually
and through the group, sponsor mandatory CPE as a requirement
of continued licensing.

This is self-regulation in the

broader sense and, as has been shown previously, has evolved

into a very comprehensive structure in the private sector.
While professional societies do not have the authority
they would have with statutory underpinnings, they do have the

support of a substantial proportion of practicing professionals.

And as membership groups, they tend to command a loyalty, a
moral responsibility and professional support from their

members.

They can thus serve as a rallying point for profes

sional pride which often is a more effective regulator than
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On the other hand, the efforts of such

governmental fiat.

groups are viewed by some as lacking in zeal and being tainted

by self-interest, and, because they do not directly control

licensing nor command subpoena power in their investigations,
their effectiveness as regulators has been challenged.

In the regulatory process, government has some dis
tinct advantages.

The process receives statutory underpinnings

and carries with it the right to license, to subpoena evidence

in investigations, and to deprive the CPA of the right to
practice.

Generally, government actions are perceived by

the public as being relatively objective and, hopefully,

consumer-oriented.

On the other hand, governmental agencies

are the creatures of legislatures and legislatures are

increasingly confronted with fiscal constraints and often
have little active interest in the profession except in times

of perceived crises.

State boards of accountancy are increas

ingly coming under umbrella state licensing and regulatory
agencies and some have thus lost part of their flexibility

and authority.

We believe that in the long run self-regulation
enhances the overall image and standing of the profession

and is, therefore, preferable to governmental regulation.
Continuous effort must be made to maintain it to the point
that it is, and is perceived to be, effective.
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If the private sector structure works well, and if
it is perceived by the public to work well, the public sector

(government on all levels) should defer to the private

sector those aspects of professional regulation which it
legally can since government ought not to do at taxpayer
expense what the private sector can do at its own expense.

What is Self-Regulation?

In its pure sense, self-regulation means regulation

of the profession by the profession alone, and without
governmental interaction.

Action by a state board of accoun

tancy, even if composed entirely of CPAs, is not technically
self-regulation since the authority of the CPAs acting as

the board is state authority.

However, our view is that

self-regulation does not preclude also being regulated by

government.

Self-regulation can be a matter of degree,

limited to certain aspects of regulation or involving cooper

ative ventures with government.

Indeed, it is unrealistic

to believe the profession could ever revert to the total

self-regulation it experienced in its early years.

Thus,

the issue is not total, pure self-regulation or none, but
rather, how best to achieve the best regulation mix of the
private and public sectors in the public interest.

We turn now to a discussion of our conclusions and
recommendations which we have broken down into five major
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elements:

1.

Entry into the profession

2.

Technical standards

3.

Maintenance of competence

4.

Surveillance of compliance with
professional standards

5.

The disciplinary process

1.

Entry into the profession

The standards for entry into the profession are estab

lished by the accountancy laws of each state and are becoming
increasingly uniform through use of Model Bills.

The committee did not consider at any length the
profession’s present recommendations with respect to education

and experience which have been adopted following extended
and searching discussion.

In addition, we spent relatively

little time discussing the Uniform CPA Examination since it
is subject to comprehensive review by NASBA, and to our knowl

edge,

it is functioning well as presently structured.

This

review of the examination process provides assurance of the

appropriateness of the examination, its administration, and
the reliance by state boards on its content.

We have no

changes to recommend in this area.

2.

Technical standards

The nature of accounting and auditing is such that

in comparable circumstances, uniform technical standards
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uniformly applied are an imperative.

The profession has long

taken a lead in the establishment of standards which by

their very nature are highly technical.

The public is

fortunate that the talent and resources are available at the
Financial Accounting Standards Board and in the Auditing

Standards Board to deal in an appropriate manner with account
ing and auditing standards needs.

Because the public interest demands uniform accounting

and auditing standards in comparable circumstances, such
standards should continue to be established at the national

level.

We believe the private sector, through FASB and AuSB

has shown itself equal to the task and has responded appro

priately to the influence and input of all concerned in both
the public and private sectors.

The resulting standards have

high credibility and should be adopted by state or federal

regulatory agencies without imposition by them of different

or additional standards.
3.

Maintenance of competence

Passage of the Uniform CPA Examination is a demonstra
tion of basic competence.

Adequate regulation of the profes

sion requires that appropriate programs be in effect to

assure that competence is maintained in an ever changing

practice environment.

Instead of requiring CPE as a condition

of membership, AICPA and the state CPA societies have adopted
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a program of encouraging state boards of accountancy to
require CPE as a condition for continued licensing.

This

has resulted in 36 states now having CPE requirement through

their accountancy statute or board regulation.

The goal of any regulation should be a uniform
standard uniformly applied.

Unfortunately, this goal has

not been met with regard to CPE.

While the vast number of

states requiring CPE have adopted 40 hours a year as the

standard, some have required 80 hours in any two years or
120 hours in any three years and some, less than 40 hours

annually.

Other states have required a certain minimum

number of hours in specified areas relating to practice.

The Division for CPA Finns requires 120 hours over three
years with at least 20 hours in any one year for professional
staff of member firms.

We believe there should be uniformity of requirements
and recommend that the profession and the state licensing

boards settle on 120 hours over three years with a minimum

of 20 hours in any one year as an appropriate standard for

membership and continued licensing.

This standard can be

modified without a change in substance in states having

biennial licensing.
We recognize that CPE as presently given in the

seminar-lecture format has been criticized since it does
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not involve a testing phase to measure what has been learned,

but we feel that inclusion of a post-course examination
would be very difficult to administer and police and would

not be cost-effective.

We believe that most practitioners

who attend CPE courses will do so with a strong motivation

toward learning and improving themselves as much as possible.
We have also considered the possibility of recommending

the development of a comprehensive examination to which state

boards could look in the process of license renewal, but have

decided that the professional activities of most practitioners
reflect a de facto specialization.

This is one of several

reasons why a broad-gauged examination is impractical.
We believe CPE is one of the effective tools to maintain

competence and for that reason, all professionals should
continue their professional education.

But CPE of itself

has serious weaknesses as a regulatory tool since it is not
a measure of competence and it does not itself monitor the

application of the knowledge acquired.

We conclude therefore

that a combination of mandatory CPE and quality review (as

described more fully on page 14) should offer substantial
assurance of the current competence of CPAs and recommend
that they be adopted as licensing requirements by all state

boards of accountancy and included as AICPA and state society
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membership requirements of all CPAs in practice.

Non

practicing CPAs should not be subject to such requirements
but should have to meet substantial catch-up CPE requirements

should they decide to enter active practice.

4.

Surveillance of compliance
with professional standards

In addition to the previously described elements of
self-regulation — entry into the profession, establishment

of technical standards, and maintenance of competence through
CPE — the profession has an additional obligation to maintain
effective surveillance of practice.

We believe the profession

must actively seek out instances of substandard work.

We also

believe that the work of all CPAs in active practice should,

on a random selection basis, be subject to a quality review

of engagements in which there is an association with financial
statements.

(a)

Positive surveillance

We are encouraged by the plan of AICPA to develop a
positive surveillance program with respect to filings made
under federal grant programs.

This provides additional

assurance to federal agency personnel to be satisfied as to

the quality of work being performed, and is an appropriate

response to criticism from various governmental agencies
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that they are receiving unsatisfactory reports and financial

statements.

This dissatisfaction often resulted from expec

tations of the government that a financial statement audit
would serve purposes it was not designed to serve.

There

is evidence that it also resulted in a number of cases from

poor work by the CPA.

Evidence of substandard work is not

confined to filings with federal agencies.

Experience by some

state CPA societies and some state boards of accountancy

with filings with state agencies, for example, revealed a

disturbing amount of substandard work by CPAs.
The plan is for AICPA to review, on a random selection

basis, filings with several federal agencies and to investigate

the work of the CPA when substandard work is Uncovered in the

same manner as if a complaint had been filed.

In addition,

seminars and conferences will be developed to educate govern

ment agency personnel with regard to the profession’s account
ing and auditing standards.

The plan is expected to avoid

unfounded complaints while at the same time reducing the
government’s regulatory burden.

AICPA has plans to mount a

counterpart program with respect to state agencies in coopera
tion with state CPA societies.

We endorse the positive

surveillance concept.
Because positive surveillance is an effective program,

we recommend that state boards adopt it as a part of their

state regulatory program.

We recognize that such a program
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demands substantial resources of funds and manpower, and

that the burden might exceed the resources available to
some boards.

We therefore recommend that AICPA develop the

guidelines and standards for the program,

and that these

guidelines and standards be reviewed by NASBA on behalf

of the boards.

Those boards with adequate capacity could,

of course, conduct their own program.

But we feel that

monitoring of the profession’s program by NASBA should make
it unnecessary for boards to mount their own individual
programs.

(b)

Quality review

The newest operating form of regulation is quality

review.

Begun as a modest voluntary program to assist local

firms by having an objective review of their work, peer

reviews have become a membership requirement in the AICPA

Division for CPA Firms, and have been used as an enforcement
tool by the SEC and some state boards of accountancy.

It is

effective because it measures quality at the source of the

professional's work product, rather than responding to a

complaint of noncompliance at some later time.
We believe this to be a healthy development, for it
evaluates the work CPAs do and how they do it.

We believe

quality review should be the keystone of any creditable
self-regulation program and greater use of the program should

-15-

be encouraged so that all CPAs in public practice are
subject, on a random selection basis, to a review of the

quality of their work with respect to their association

with financial statements.

Such reviews would be directed

to measuring the practitioner’s compliance with GAAS, SAARS

and GAAP through a review of selected reports.

Such a

review would involve a larger number of an individual's
reports than would the positive surveillance review described

above since the positive surveillance review usually would be
limited to a single report of any firm filed with an agency,

except where a more extensive review is called for by
perceived deficiencies.

Candidates for quality review could

be selected randomly by state accountancy boards from among

licensees.

Members of firms which had been recently reviewed

in compliance with a review program acceptable to the AICPA
Division for Firms would not be subject to a second review.

The profession would have to supply the manpower to
conduct the reviews.

As would be the case in our positive

surveillance recommendations and to achieve a uniform
approach, AICPA would develop guidelines and standards by
which quality reviews would be conducted and for overall
coordination of the program.

Manpower and conduct of the

reviews would be the responsibility of the state CPA societies
and the AICPA.

The findings of the reviews would be

reported to the state boards of accountancy.
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Like our suggestion for positive surveillance, this
is an ambitious program and will have to be adopted in a

measured way.

Too fast a growth would strain the limited

number of reviewers we estimate would be available at any one
time.

Too slow a growth would deprive the public of the

protection a quality review gives and practitioners of the

very real benefits to be derived.

Random selection rather

than cyclical selection provides the necessary flexibility
and reduces overall cost of the program.
The AICPA and state CPA societies should complement

the state boards’ requirements by modifying their bylaws to
provide a mechanism for quality reviews on a random selection

basis.

This authority would be exercised only if the

accountancy board failed to act, or if its random selection
seemed inadequate as measured by national norms.
The possibility of being selected for a quality review,

regardless of whether the selection is made by an accountancy
board or by AICPA or a state society, should act as a positive
influence on practitioners to perform well.

In addition,

such a review program should be educational and corrective

in nature.

Where deficiencies are not material, we recommend

they be pointed out to the CPA and no further action taken.
If they are substantial, other appropriate action should be
taken, including disciplinary hearings.
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We believe that once again, this is an area in which
the private sector, with its substantial resources, can

do a creditable job in conjunction with state licensing
boards.

We believe that state boards can receive and rely
on the end product of the profession’s programs.

However,

if the profession expects the state boards to rely on it
in this area, it will have to accept close cooperation and
maintain close communication with the boards so that the

boards can assure themselves that the program is objective,
impartial and substantial.

If, on investigation, the state

boards can satisfy themselves on these points, we believe
they should defer mounting their own programs.

The use of

NASBA in an oversight role on behalf of the state boards
should be an integral part of this program.

5.

The disciplinary process

We have proposed a program which combines mandatory

CPE, positive surveillance of practice and randomly selected

quality reviews.

The latter two elements undoubtedly will

uncover instances of substandard work which call for evalua
tion and, in appropriate cases, discipline.

In addition, the

state boards and the profession must continue to receive and
evaluate complaints alleging substandard work by CPAs.

-18-

CPAs should not be expected to answer more often
than necessary to allegations that they have failed to

observe professional standards.

Nevertheless, some duplica

tion is probably unavoidable, particularly if the profession
wishes to retain a high degree of self-regulation.

The Joint Ethics Enforcement Program (JEEP) as
presently constructed melds the efforts of the AICPA and 44

state CPA societies.

To the extent that AICPA and a partic

ular society formerly were each investigating the same
complaint, the program has reduced duplication by assigning
the investigation to one or the other body.

Trials conducted

by the Joint Trial Board affect membership status in both
AICPA and the state society when they join as complainants.

We recommend continued efforts to extend JEEP to all
state societies and that it be expanded to provide for more
cooperation with state boards as further described in this

report.
The AICPA Division for Firms, SEC practice section,
has established a Special Investigation Committee (SIC) to look

into litigation and certain other circumstances involving CPA
firms which could indicate deficiencies in professional

standards or performance.

The purpose of the SIC investiga

tion is to achieve a prompt consideration of whether a change
in generally accepted auditing standards is needed and whether
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any changes in the specific firm’s quality control standards

or their administration is called for.

Except in unusual

cases, the investigation would not deal with the questioned
engagement itself while litigation is pending.

This

mechanism provides for an early look at the underlying

issues and we believe it offers an appropriate response to
the public- interest in minimizing possible future problems

of the same nature.

Any complaint to the ethics division

involving matters coming within the jurisdiction of the

SIC would be referred to the SIC and JEEP would defer its

investigation.

If during its investigation, the SIC

determines that there is an apparent violation of GAAS or

GAAP by an individual AICPA member, it would immediately
refer the matter to the AICPA ethics division for normal JEEP
processing.

In most cases, a final determination by the

ethics division would not be made until such time as litiga

tion on the case had been resolved.

Thus, although the SIC

would involve some duplication of investigation with that

of JEEP, it does not appear to be a serious problem, and
in any event, such duplication appears justified by the
public interest in having a prompt response to matters which
could have direct future consequences.

State boards have ultimate control over the right to
practice, a responsibility which is fundamental to their

existence and cannot be delegated as such.

Nevertheless,

they can and do rely on the profession in carrying out various
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Thus, we believe the degree

of reliance by state boards on the profession will be a
direct function of the credibility of the profession’s
process and that by proper communication and cooperation,

duplication can be kept to a reasonable level.

We propose the following disciplinary procedures:

A.

Any complaint received by, or potential

violation coming to the attention of the
ethics division or state society relating

to members, including references from
state boards of accountancy, positive

surveillance, quality review and SIC

activities, would be subjected to a reg

ular investigation under the JEEP program.
Investigations resulting in finding no vio

lation, issuing letters of constructive
comments, and issuing administrative repri
mands either with or without the requirement
for continuing professional education, would

be closed without further action.

NASBA

would be engaged on behalf of state boards

to make periodic reviews of the investigation

and disciplinary activities of JEEP to estab
lish that the process being followed was appro

priate in the circumstances.

A state board

could elect to make its own review in lieu
of NASBA if it so desired.
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B.

If the JEEP investigation reaches a conclusion
that a disciplinary hearing (trial board
proceeding) is warranted, the appropriate
state board(s) would be advised of the results

of the investigation, together with an indica
tion of the intent of the profession to hold a
hearing unless the state board wished to assume

responsibility at that time.

If the state

board did not decide to enter the process

at that time, the profession would proceed with
the hearing, keeping the state board advised

of the progress and the findings of such a
hearing.

While state boards would undoubtedly

establish different criteria, presumably all
of them would decide to enter the process immed

iately if it appeared that the apparent violation
was such that a suspension or revocation of

license was likely to result.

In other cases,

they might defer to the profession until such

time as a hearing had more clearly established
all of the facts and a determination was

reached by the profession as to the extent
of professional violations, if any.
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C.

If upon reading the results of the profession’s

hearing (which could include a recommendation
to the state board to suspend or revoke a
license), the state board felt that further
action was required on its part, including the

possible revocation or suspension of license

to practice, they would convene an additional
hearing.

Although this would entail some

duplication, presumably most of the facts
developed at the first hearing could be stip
ulated.

We believe that most members of the

AICPA and state societies would prefer this

process even though it potentially did entail
some duplication.

However, if a member was so

inclined, he could request the state board to
hold the initial hearing and thus avoid possible

duplication.
D.

If at any point the state board decided to

enter the process, the profession would cease

activities on its own behalf, cooperate to the
extent practicable with the state board, and,

except in the most unusual circumstances, accept

the conclusions of the state board hearing.
(Suspension or revocation of license normally

would constitute an automatic suspension or
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termination of membership in the Institute

or state society.

Reprimands or other

discipline would not automatically affect
membership.)

E.

Any complaint or referral received by the
ethics division or state society relating to

a CPA not a member of the AICPA or state
society would be referred to the state board
for consideration.

In some cases, the state

board might wish to undertake its own
investigation at this point.

However, in

the majority of cases, the state board would
be expected to refer the complaint (or any

other complaint that it may have received
directly) to JEEP for investigation on behalf

of the state board.

The results of such

investigation would be provided to the state
board which would take such action as it

considers appropriate.

F.

In those cases in which the state board chooses

to investigate on its own and not refer the
matter to JEEP, it is conceivable that JEEP
could also be investigating the same matter

based on a complaint received from independent
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sources.

Duplication in such cases would

be avoided by inquiry to the respondent
during the investigation since the respon

dent would obviously be aware if the
state board was also looking into the

matter.

At such time, the profession

would drop its investigation and offer to

cooperate with the state board.

The state

board would notify JEEP of its resolution

of the matter.
A basic problem is that certain critics of the

profession’s self-regulatory efforts have questioned its
effectiveness.

One reason they can challenge is that so much

of the present disciplinary effort is conducted in private.
We recognize that the Council only recently has rejected a
proposal to make joint trial board hearings open to the public.

But we feel that the present confidentiality of proceedings
adds greatly to the lack of credibility in the process.

We

believe a better overall job is being done than has been con

veyed to the public and recommend that disciplinary hearings
whether by state boards or by the profession be made open

to all interested parties.

Some will argue that if hearings

are open, unwarranted damage to reputation can result from
public hearings in which the respondent is found not guilty.

But we do not believe this has proved to be so in those states

-25where state boards hold public hearings and, on balance, the

benefits to the credibility of the disciplinary process
appear to outweigh such considerations.

Further, we recommend that public members be added
to all hearing panels, both of the profession and of state
boards of accountancy.

Such persons should be well grounded

in accounting matters.

Their contribution to the proceeding

would be to give the hearing panel an insight into public

expectations and the public some comfort that its interests

were represented.

The policy of the AICPA and state societies to
defer active investigation while matters are in litigation

also has been criticized.

The SEC practice section executive

committee is studying this question and its conclusions

will be subject to review by the Public Oversight Board (POB).

If the POB recommends to the executive committee any changes

in the policy of deferral, AICPA should consider adopting
a similar policy.

State boards may under appropriate circum

stances continue to take disciplinary action while matters
are still in litigation.

The Free-Standing Organization (FSO)

The committee is aware that some critics feel that
the regulatory process will never be fully creditable so
long as it functions within the existing professional organ

izations.

To accommodate this concern, creation of a new
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organization, free standing from the profession and other

organizations has been suggested.
While such a free-standing body might function effec

tively, we do not recommend its consideration at this time

because it would involve the creation of a whole new function

and structure which would be costly, difficult to staff,
and would entail unavoidable delay and error in its early

stages.

We feel that the program we have outlined if

adopted and implemented would deal adequately with the
credibility problem and a whole new structure would be

unnecessary.

